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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIONS ON CORPORATE
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,1 the Supreme Court
held that a state may prohibit a corporation from using general treasury
funds for "independent expenditures" 2 in connection with state elec-
tions.' The decision marks the first time the Court directly has addressed
the constitutionality of restrictions on corporations' "independent ex-
penditures."4 Many commentators criticized the Austin ruling as a de-
parture from prior first amendment rulings and as censorship.5 The
decision, however, merely extends principles enunciated in earlier high
Court opinions, dissents, and concurrences concerning campaign
financing.
1. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990).
2. The Michigan statute defined an "expenditure" as:
a payment, donation, loan, pledge, or promise of payment of money or anything of ascer-
tainable value for goods, materials, services, or facilities in assistance of, or in opposition
to, the nomination or election of a candidate, or the qualification, passage, or defeat of a
ballot question... (2) Expenditure includes a contribution or a transfer of anything of
ascertainable monetary value for purposes of influencing the nomination or election of any
candidate or the qualification, passage or defeat of any ballot question. (3) Expenditure
does not include:... (c) An expenditure for communication on a subject or issue if the
communication does not support or oppose a ballot issue or candidate by name or clear
inference or an expenditure for the establishment, administration, or solicitation of contri-
butions to a fund or independent ommittee ... (d) An expenditure by a broadcasting
station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical or publication for any news story, com-
mentary or editorial in support of of opposition to a candidate for elective office, or a ballot
question in the regular course of publication or broadcasting.
MICH. COMp. LAWS § 169.206 (1979).
The statute defined an "independent expenditure" as "an expenditure as defined in § 6 [see preced-
ing paragraph] by a person if the expenditure is not made at the direction of, or under the control of,
another person and if the expenditure is not a contribution to a committee." MICH. CoMP. Laws
§ 169.209(1).
3. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1402.
4. See Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S.
480, 496 (1985); Bellotti v. First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. 765, 788 n.26 (1978).
5. See Wall St. J., April 5, 1990, at A23 (criticizing the Austin decision for allowing states to
bar corporations from telling voters what they think of candidates; the author suggests this is "no
great leap" from prohibiting corporate speech on "causes and issues"); St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
April 8, 1990, at B3, col. 5 (syndicated columnist George Will claimed the Austin ruling "contra-
dicted 70 years of First Amendment law"). But see N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1990, § 3, at 13 (S.P. Sethi
argued that the Court's ruling advanced the interests of minority shareholders and removed barriers
to entry in the marketplace for ideas); L.A. Times, March 28, 1990, Part A, at 4 (quoting Federal
Election Commission spokesman Fred Eiland applauding the decision, saying, "If the decision had
gone the other way, it would have opened a huge hole in the law and allowed corporate and labor
money to pour into election campaigns").
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The seminal case in the area of campaign financing is Buckley v.
Valeo.6 The Court in Buckley distinguished "independent expenditures"
from "contributions" 7 and held that restrictions on the former violated
the first amendment's guarantee of free speech, while restrictions upon
the latter did not.'
The Court drew upon Buckley in Bellotti v. First National Bank of
Boston,9 and struck down a Massachusetts statute that prohibited corpo-
rations from making contributions and independent expenditures to in-
fluence referenda. 10 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, opined that
the Massachusetts Legislature could not restrict the spending at issue,
which it viewed as political discourse, solely because it emanated from a
corporation." The Court distinguished limitations on spending in the
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
7. Justice Marshall later withdrew his support for the distinction between independent ex-
penditures and direct contributions, finding that experience had proved the distinction meaningless.
See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21. Many statutes distinguish expenditures from contributions.
See, eg., IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.29 (West Supp. 1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 121.025 (Michie
Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1989); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 211B.15
(Supp. 1989); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-35-227 (1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.03 (Page
1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 4219 (West Supp. 1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-132 (1985);
W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-8 to 3-8-13 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 11.38 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988).
Expenditures are outlays of resources not coordinated through a candidate's campaign machine
and whose source is unknown to the candidate, while contributions are transfers of resources from a
donor directly to a candidate or his campaign. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19-21.
The Buckley Court reasoned that contributions serve merely as symbols of support for a candidate
but do not communicate the basis for the support. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21. As such, contributions
could not qualify as free speech because they could become political debate only through the speech
of the recipient. Id. Further, the Court found that direct contributions involve a threat of corrup-
tion or the appearance of corruption to the electoral process compelling enough to justify govern-
ment restrictions on them. Id. at 26.
The Buckley Court defined "corruption" narrowly, as the quid pro quo exchange of financial
resources for improper commitments from a candidate. Id. at 26-27, 47. The Court asserted that
the contribution transaction, in which the candidate knows the donor's identity, poses this threat,
but that the independent expenditure transaction, in which the candidate does not know the donor's
identity, necessarily could not pose the same threat. Id. at 22. The Court also noted that independ-
ent expenditures communicate ideas and contribute to the political discourse and, therefore, qualify
as free speech. Id. at 18-19.
9. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
10. Id. at 767-68. Expenditures and contributions made to influence referenda that affected the
property, business, or assets of a corporation were an exception to the general ban. Id.
11. Id. at 784. The Bellotti appellants, two banks and three corporations, challenged the Mas-
sachusetts statute because they wanted to voice their opposition to a referendum to impose a gradu-
ated income tax on individuals. Id. at 768-70. The Court categorized the spending Massachusetts
sought to regulate as valuable political discourse, "indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy."
Id. at 777. The Court noted that "[i]f the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest
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referendum context from bans on spending in relation to candidate elec-
tions, noting that no possibility for corruption exists when a corporation
expends resources to further a referendum issue.12
In Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work Commit-
tee,'3 the Court scrutinized and upheld a federal law forbidding corpora-
tions and labor unions from making contributions in connection with
federal elections. 14 The provision at issue served a dual purpose: 1) to
that the State could silence their proposed speech" and that the source of speech does not change its
value. Id.
The Court rejected the State's argument that the great wealth of corporations empowered them to
influence unduly the outcome of referenda and stressed that "the people in a democracy are en-
trusted with the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting argu-
ments." Id. at 791. The Court conceded that if the State had shown that corporate advocacy had
overwhelmed the voices of other participants in the political discourse, then the restrictions upon
corporate advocacy might have been warranted. Id. at 789.
The Court also dismissed the State's argument that the restriction protected minority shareholders
who might disagree with the views supported by their corporation. Id. at 792-95. Justice Powell
pointed out that shareholders had invested in the corporation by their own "volition" and, because
they were free to withdraw their resources at any time, were not compelled to contribute to the
corporation's free speech with which they might disagree. Powell further argued that shareholders
who disagreed with corporate spending on a given issue could lobby for replacement of the directors,
adopt provisions to the corporation's charter to forbid such spending, or bring a derivative share-
holder's suit challenging the disbursements. Id. at 795.
12. Id. at 790. Justices White and Rehnquist authored dissents in the Bellotti decision. White
maintained that the use in the political arena of wealth acquired with the aid of special state-con-
ferred benefits, such as limited liability, perpetual life, and the accumulation, distribution, and taxa-
tion of assets, worked to create an unfair advantage that the state had an interest in preventing. Id.
Justice White reasoned that "the expenditure of funds to promote political causes may be assumed to
bear some relationship to the fervency with which they are held" and that, because "corporate polit-
ical expression ... is divorced from the convictions of shareholders," it fails to reflect the proportion-
ate amount of support for a given proposition among voters and is unfair. Id. at 810.
White also argued that corporate political expenditures harmed the minority shareholders of the
corporation by compelling them to provide financial assistance for beliefs with which they might
disagree. Id. at 813. He argued that shareholders invest for profits and should not have "to choose
between supporting the propagation of views with which they disagree and passing up investment
opportunities." Id. at 818.
Rehnquist reasoned that the liberties of political expression are not essential to the furtherance of
the economic purposes for which corporations are created and that the possibility that a corporation
might use its economic power to obtain benefits through the political process justifies a state in
limiting the political expenditures of corporations. Id. at 825-28.
13. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
14. Id. at 298. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 forbade corporations from making
contributions or expenditures in connection with certain federal elections. Id. at 198 n. 1. However,
the federal scheme permitted corporations to organize political action committees (PACs) that could
solicit funds from a limited number of persons who qualified as members. These committees could
then make contributions and expenditures from these funds at their discretion. Id. at 201-02. The
government alleged that the defendant had solicited contributions from people who did not qualify
as members and, therefore, violated the statute. Id. at 197-98. In response to the prosecution's
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prevent corporations from exercising undue influence over legislators
through "war chests" amassed by the corporate form; and 2) to protect
the first amendment rights of contributors who may be opposed to candi-
dates the corporation supports. The Court concluded that these pur-
poses justified an encroachment upon a corporation's first amendment
rights.' 5
The Supreme Court in Federal Election Commission v. National Con-
servative Political Action Committee, Inc. (NCPAC), 16 however, struck
down restrictions on independent expenditures by certain political action
committees.' 7 The majority held that, because committees like the
NCPAC were "designed expressly to participate in political debate,"' 8
they did not pose the threat of corruption' 9 to the electoral process that
the corporate war chests20 in National Right to Work did. Therefore, the
appeal of a reversal of the defendant's conviction for soliciting nonmembers, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of the restrictions on corporate expenditures and contributions. Id. at 206-10.
15. Id. at 207-08. The court distinguished Bellotti on the grounds that Bellotti involved ex-
penditures in furtherance of expressing a view on a referendum; the spending in National Right to
Work Committee occurred in the context of candidate elections in which there is greater potential for
corruption or the appearance of corruption. Id. at 210 n.7. The Court further reasoned that the
corporate form might pose a special danger of corrupting or appearing to corrupt the political pro-
cess. Thus, the Court deferred to the legislature's "judgment that the special characteristics of the
corporate structure require particularly careful regulation." Id. at 209-10. The Court did not re-
quire Congress to find that corporations actually pose such a danger; instead, the majority argued
that the mere potential for improperly influencing the political process justified a restriction on cor-
porations' first amendment rights. Id.
16. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). The three NCPAC plaintiffs, the Democratic Party, the Democratic
National Committee, and an individual, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to enforce
a provision of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act. The Act established a system of public
funding for presidential candidates. Id at 482. Only candidates who elected to receive public funds
were subject to its restrictions. Id. The provision at issue prohibited any political action committee,
other than the one designated by the candidate, from making independent expenditures exceeding
$1,000 for the benefit of the candidate receiving public funding. Id.
17. Id. at 500.
18. Justice Rehnquist, author of the majority opinion, viewed the PACs as groups of individu-
als who had "pooled their resources to amplify their voices." Id. at 494. He considered it significant
that in 1979-80, approximately 101,000 people contributed an average of $75 each to the NCPAC.
Rehnquist argued that to prohibit these people from so pooling their resources to amplify their
voices "would subordinate those of modest means as opposed to those sufficiently wealthy to be able
to buy expensive media ads with their own resources." Id. at 495.
19. The Court again defined corruption narrowly as "the financial quid pro quo: dollars for
political favors." Id at 497-98. The Court's definition of corruption did not include the influence or
clout a group might yield. In fact, Justice Rehnquist said that the fact that a politician might "alter
or reaffirm his stance on an issue" in response to political messages paid for by PACs hardly can be
called corruption, for one of the essential features of democracy is the presentation to the electorate
of varying points of view. Id. at 498.
20. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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Federal Election Commission could not restrict the activities of political
action committees in the same way.21
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for /ife, 2 2
the Court held unconstitutional restrictions on independent expenditures
against a corporation that: (1) had been organized for the purpose of
promoting political ideas; (2) did not have any shareholders or others
affiliated with it so as to have a claim on the corporation's assets or earn-
ings; and (3) had not been established by a business corporation or labor
union.23 Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan maintained that Mas-
sachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL) did not threaten the marketplace for
ideas in the way that other corporations might and, therefore, the restric-
tions on independent expenditures were unconstitutional as to MCFL.24
21. NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 498. Both Justice Marshall and Justice White authored dissents. Id.
at 502, 518. Justice Marshall withdrew his support from that portion of the Buckley decision that
distinguished contributions from independent expenditures. Id. at 519-20. Marshall argued that the
restrictions on individual contributions to campaigns motivated people to use independent expendi-
tures to benefit candidates who recognize and reward the expenditures just as if they were contribu-
tions. Id. at 519-20. Therefore, Marshall claimed that such a distinction ignores reality. Id.
Justice White, who had never accepted the Buckley distinction between contributions and in-
dependent expenditures, repeated his position. Id. at 508. White emphasized that functionally indi-
vidual expenditures by PACs cannot be distinguished from contributions. Id. at 510. White
contended that both present equal potential for corruption in a world of tacit understandings and
implied agreements. Therefore, the courts should defer to Congress' determination that independent
expenditures should be regulated closely. Id. at 510.
22. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). The Federal Election Commission sought to prosecute Massachusetts
Citizens for Life (MCFL), a corporation, under the provisions of the National Campaign Finance
Act. Under the federal regulations, MCFL's newsletter constituted an independent expenditure
made from the general treasury funds of a corporation. However, MCFL was a non-stock, non-
profit corporation organized by a group of individuals to promote pro-life policies. Id at 24142.
23. Id. at 263-64. Justice Brennan's analysis of the threat corporations pose to the electoral
process differed from previous majority opinions. Prior cases had defined corruption narrowly, see
supra note 8, but Brennan argued that recent opinions had expressed concern over the "corrosive
influence of concentrated corporate wealth" and the need to protect the marketplace of ideas from
the "unfair advantage" that large corporate treasuries confer upon their keepers. Id. at 267-58.
Justice Brennan explained that a free market of ideas serves the interests of a democracy. Moreover,
he noted that political "free trade" does not require all market participants to expend equal re-
sources, but rather demands that the funds devoted to promoting a given idea roughly approximate
the amount of support for that idea. Id. at 257-58. Brennan argued that expenditure restrictions
assure that the resources expended promoting an idea roughly represent the popular support for the
idea and in doing so "ensure that competition among actors in the political process is truly competi-
tion among ideas." Id. at 259. In the case of MCFL, Brennan maintained that the corporation
derived its wealth not from the economic arena, but from people who agreed with its political objec-
tives. Thus, the resources the corporation expended in the political marketplace represented the
modicum of support for the views it promoted, making the expenditure restrictions unnecessary. Id.
24. Id. at 259. Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, argued that as a corporation, MCFL differed from
other corporations only in degree and not in kind. Id. at 268. He maintained that the judiciary
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Recently, the Supreme Court examined the validity of Michigan's stat-
utory restrictions on independent expenditures in Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce.25 The Court concluded that "the unique state-
conferred corporate structure that facilitates the amassing of large trea-
suries warrants the limit on independent expenditures,"26 and not the
mere fact that corporations are capable of accumulating large amounts of
wealth.27 The Court noted that corporate treasuries reflect the economic
decisions of consumers and investors and that a corporation should not
be able to transfer monetary power amassed in these markets into polit-
ical clout through independent expenditures.28 The majority concluded
that the Michigan statute survived constitutional scrutiny as a "narrowly
tailored solution" to the "serious danger. . . that corporate political
expenditures will undermine the integrity of the political process. "29
should defer to the legislature's determination that corporations pose a significant danger of corrup-
tion to the electoral process and apply the restrictions to MCFL. Id. at 269.
25. 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990). In Austin, the state restriction paralleled the federal scheme, requir-
ing corporations to make political expenditures through PACs. Id. at 1395 n.1. However, the Mich-
igan statute differed from the federal scheme in that it did not apply to labor unions. Id. The
Chamber of Commerce challenged the regulation on equal protection grounds based upon this dis-
tinction. See Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 856 F.2d 783, 785 (6th Cir. 1988);
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 397, 398 (W.D. Mich. 1986). The
Chamber of Commerce dropped this ground before the appeal reached the high Court. One might
cynically view the whole Austin litigation as a struggle between corporate employers in Michigan
and the unincorporated unions with whom they deal.
26. Austin, 110 S. CL at 1398.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1397. The majority distinguished the Chamber of Commerce from Massachusetts
Citizens for Life. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text. The Court emphasized that the
Chamber's bylaws set forth many varied purposes, dissenting members faced economic disincentives
to disassociating with the Chamber, and business corporations dominated the Chamber's member-
ship. Id. at 1398-1400.
29. Id. at 1402. The Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to the statute's exemp-
tion for media corporations. Id. at 1401-02. The majority argued that "the unique role of the press"
as a forum for discussion, debate, and dissemination of information justified the exemption. Id. at
1402.
Justice Brennan concurred with the majority emphasizing that the Michigan statute did not pro-
hibit corporations from disseminating their political views but merely required them to use PACs.
Id. at 1402 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan explained that his majority opinion in MCFL
had recognized that the PAC requirements might "be unconstitutional as applied to some corpora-
tions because they do not present the dangers at which the expenditure limitations are aimed." Such
a class, Brennan opined, would be small. Id. at 1404. Indeed, Justice Brennan maintained that the
MCFL court had adopted the underlying principle of the Federal Election Campaign Act-that
"substantial general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political purposes." Id. at 1403.
Brennan stressed that a case by case application of MCFL would not censor ideas or suppress speech
but would only recognize characteristic differences among organizations. Id. at 1404 n.3. Justice
Brennan also voiced great concern for minority shareholders and members of organizations who
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss3/11
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The arguments voiced by the majority and dissenting opinions in Aus-
tin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce are neither new nor groundbreak-
ing. Instead, Austin represents only the latest repackaging of the ideas
that appeared in the many cases concerning restrictions on political ex-
penditures since the Court decided Buckley v. Valeo.30 The early deci-
sion in Bellotti v. First National Bank of Boston favored a rather
restrictive view of the government's power to limit political expendi-
tures."1 However, the decisions in Massachusetts Citizens for Life 32 and
hold views contrary to those of the organization, but who cannot disassociate themselves from the
group. Id. at 1405-06. He emphasized that "the state surely has a compelling interest in preventing
a corporation it has chartered from exploiting those who do not wish to contribute to the chamber's
message." Id. at 1406.
Justice Scalia, in a dissenting opinion, claimed that the majority had combined two bad arguments
to justify its position: (1) the special advantages state law confers on corporations justify infringe-
ments upon their first amendment rights; and (2) large corporate treasuries can distort the political
process when they are used to sway public opinion. Id at 1408-09 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia
demonstrated that neither argument, examined separately, could justify the restraints approved by
the majority and that combining the two only confused matters. Id. at 1409. Scalia concluded that
the majority's argument really masked a rule that expenditures must reflect the public support for a
proposal, and he maintained that Buckley explicitly had rejected this idea. Id. at 1411.
Scalia further faulted the majority for finding that the Michigan Legislature had tailored the stat-
ute narrowly to prevent the spending of corporate "war chests" on political causes. Id. at 1413.
Justice Scalia argued that a narrowly tailored statute would restrict the first amendment rights of
only those corporations actually possessing "war chests," and not those that simply have the poten-
tial to amass such resources. Id. Scalia charged the majority with ignoring the "clear and present
danger" test adopted by the Court fifty-three years prior. Id. at 1413.
Finally, Scalia criticized the majority for ignoring the basic tenants of our democratic system,
which promote the free exchange of ideas, trust the electorate to make the best choice through
collective decision making, and generally hold that "there is no such thing as too much free speech."
Id. at 1416.
Justice Kennedy, in his own dissenting opinion, echoed many of the concerns of Justice Scalia. Id
at 1416 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He argued that the Michigan statute created "distinctions based
on the speech and the speaker" and as such, "engag[ed] in the rawest form of censorship." Id. at
1419. Further, Kennedy charged that the majority, in applying MCFL, acted as a censor because it
only protected "a preferred class of nonprofit corporate speakers: small, single issue nonprofit cor-
porations." Id.
Kennedy maintained that precedent dictates that the Court differentiate between expenditures and
contributions. Id. at 1420. Thus, because the Michigan statute limited expenditures, it contravened
the constitutional limits within which states may fight corruption of the political process. Id. Ken-
nedy also noted that the majority redefined corruption to encompass the "corrosive and distortive"
effects of corporate wealth on the electoral system. Id. Finally, Kennedy argued that the PACs
were not adequate substitutes for free corporate speech because voters do not view PACs as credible
sources of information. Id. at 1423.
30. See supra notes 1-24 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
32. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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National Conservative Political Action Committee 33 suggest that the
Court had adopted a more permissive view of restrictions on political
spending. By approving a system prescribing the means by which corpo-
rations may exercise their first amendment rights via independent ex-
penditures, the Court in Austin adopted its most permissive view of
limitations on political spending. Indeed, the four dissenters from the
Bellotti decision, Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist,
comprise four of the six members of the Austin majority.34
The Austin decision may prompt more states to require corporations
to express their political views through political action committees. Ten
states already have provisions analogous to the Michigan scheme upheld
in Austin." In states that choose to enact similar laws, the number of
political action committees will increase.36 For those corporations that
form PACs in response to such legislation, the Austin decision will sim-
ply alter the vehicle for expressing corporate political opinion. Rather
than make direct expenditures, corporations will resort to PAC expendi-
tures to promote their views.37 However, not all corporations will find it
either feasible or practical to establish a PAC.38 These corporations are
generally small, financially weak, or larger, politically inactive corpora-
tions. When such corporations are denied access to the marketplace of
ideas, the public is denied the benefit of their views in political discourse.
Furthermore, schemes similar to that in Michigan might fall prey to
clever corporate officials. Corporate-sponsored PACs in Michigan can
33. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
34. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1394-95. The departure of Justices Brennan and Marshall from the
Court leaves four members of the majority to defend the Austin decision.
35. See supra note 8.
36. The number of PACs undoubtedly will increase because, while not all corporations will
choose to establish one, many will in order to continue to express their views on political issues and
candidates.
37. These corporations, however, will pay a higher economic cost to express their views
through PACs. See infra note 38.
38. PACs require substantial funds to operate, as both the majority and dissenting opinions in
Austin note. See Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1396, 1397, 1400. Mandatory procedures, such as hiring a
treasurer for the separate fund, keeping detailed accounts of contributions, filing a statement of
organization with state officials, and soliciting contributions from eligible persons all add to the costs
of maintaining a PAC in compliance with state law. Id. at 1397. These costs can consume as much
as 25% to 50% of a PACs total funding. Id. at 1423.
In light of the many costs of compliance, many corporations probably will not form PACs. For
example, a small corporation that fails to qualify for the Massachusetts Citizens for Life exception,
see supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text, may not have the resources to establish and maintain a
PAC. Likewise, a larger corporation that involves itself in politics infrequently will choose not to
incur the costs associated with operating a PAC.
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solicit funds from their sponsor's shareholders, officers, directors, and
certain upper-level employees.39 A corporation could solicit contribu-
tions for its PAC from eligible employees with the understanding that the
corporation would reimburse the employee either through a bonus or
salary raise.4' This arrangement would thwart the statutory scheme
designed to prevent "the corrosive and distorting effects of immense ag-
gregations of wealth... accumulated with the help of the corporate form
... that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corpo-
ration's [now the PAC's] political ideas."41 This problem, however,
might be better left to the state legislatures and election commissions.
Nevertheless, given the inability of small corporations to sustain PACs,
statutory schemes such as that upheld in Austin might, ironically,
strengthen or amplify the voices of the large corporations that success-
fully divert general treasury funds through employees to the corpora-
tion's PAC.
Justice Kennedy, in his dissenting opinion, argued that political action
committees lack credibility with voters. Thus, Kennedy concluded that
requiring a corporate speaker to use a PAC was tantamount to a denial
of that speaker's right to speak.42 Oddly enough, the Austin decision
may alter this situation. Kennedy asserts that PACs lack credibility be-
cause the public views them as "ad hoc organizations with little con-
tinuity or responsibility."43 However, when a state requires corporations
to utilize PACs, the credibility problem evaporates. Voters will learn
that a statement by a corporate-sponsored PAC is the equivalent of a
statement by the sponsoring corporation,' and the credibility of the cor-
poration becomes that of the PAC.
The Austin decision ultimately may focus more attention on PACs and
the problems they present. PACs recently have come under attack by
critics who charge that they facilitate the purchasing of politicians, dis-
courage new people with new ideas from entering the political arena, and
39. MICH. COMP. LAws. § 169.255(2).
40. Some have questioned whether a corporate manager really has a choice when her superior
requests that she contribute to their corporation's PAC. See Gross, The Corporate PAC: Should We
Pac It In?, 34 FED. B. NEws & J. 63 (1987).
41. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
42. Id. at 1423 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
43. Id.
44. This is necessarily true because the only way a corporation can express its political views in
a state like Michigan is through a PAC. Therefore, voters can consider the PAC as an extension of
the corporation with all the clout and credibility of the sponsoring corporation.
1991]
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generally undermine the integrity and effectiveness of legislative bodies.45
Moreover, many of the arguments launched against PACs resemble the
Austin majority's attacks on corporate expenditures. For example, the
Austin court claimed that one problem with allowing unrestrained corpo-
rate expenditures on political issues was that the resources spent support-
ing the corporation's view did not reflect the popular support for the
position.' Similarly, one argument against PACs is that the well-organ-
ized organizations garner resources and wield influence disproportionate
to the public support for the positions they promote.47
In sum, the Austin decision affects corporate campaign spending both
practically and theoretically. The practical effect of the decision pro-
motes greater reliance on corporate-sponsored PACs, while raising larger
theoretical questions concerning the desirability of PACs. The most sig-
nificant aspect of the Austin decision, however, may not be what it does,
but what it signals: a willingness on the part of the Supreme Court to
uphold election reform measures aimed at the corruptive effects of wealth
on the political process.48
J Patrick Bradley
45. See Boren, Special Interest Money: A Threat to Democratic Government, L.A. Daily J.,
May 27, 1988, at § 19, col. 1; Morris, Get Off My PAC, 92 CASE & COM., Mar.-Apr. 1987, at 30;
Wash. Post, Sept. 6, 1990, at D1; Broder, Bob Michel, Campaign Reformer, Chicago Trib., June 24,
1990, at C3; N.Y. Times, May 13, 1990, § 4 at 18.
46. Austin, 110 S. Ct. at 1397.
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